主题：Information Disclosure in a Supermodular Game

报告时间：2024年11月20日（周三）下午15:30—17:00

报告地点：文化中心305会议室

主讲人：上海财经大学  杜宁华教授

主持人：yl23455永利  叶 航教授

Abstract:

We experimentally study the effectiveness of information disclosure in a binary-action supermodular game with state-dependent payoff. An information designer, who observes the state, aims to maximize the choice of high (instead of low) action by the players who are unaware of the state. The players prefer the high action when the state is “favorable”; when it’s “unfavorable”, they prefer the low action. The designer utilizes information disclosure to induce high action. We find in the experiment that, compared to no disclosure, both truthful and persuasive disclosures can raise frequency of the high action. We also find that, contrary to predictions, persuasive disclosure fails to be better than truthful disclosure.

嘉宾介绍：

杜宁华，上海财经大学yl23455永利教授，经济系系主任。2005年获得美国亚利桑那大学经济学博士学位，主攻实验经济学。亚利桑那大学的经济科学实验室是北美最早成立的实验经济学研究基地，由2002年诺贝尔奖得主Vernon Smith创建。杜宁华多年来致力于运用实验方法研究机制设计问题，其研究成果发表在管理学顶级国际刊物Management Science，以及Games and Economic Behavior，European Economic Review，Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization，Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Decision Support Systems等经济学国际一流刊物上。他编著的《实验经济学：方法与实例》是国内第一本实验经济学教材，深受相关研究者的欢迎，目前已出第二版。